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Although the revision of copyright law effected by the
Copyright Act of 19761 was largely brought about by Con-
gress' realization that the Copyright Act of 1909' was inade-
quate to deal with the numerous technological advances made
since then,8 the new act did not deal with all new technologi-
cal discoveries previously made to which the copyright law
would apply.' In particular, the 1976 Copyright Act contained
no specific provision regarding the home use of audiovisual
tape recording of television broadcasts (VTR)5 despite the
0 1981 by Adrienne J. Marsh.
* B.S., University of Chicago; M.S., N.Y.U.; J.D., 1980, Fordham University; Mem-
ber, New York Bar. The author wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Hugh
Hansen for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-2318 (Supp. II 1978). For a history of the development of
copyright protection see L. PATTERSON, COPYmGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTV (1968);
Note, Copyright: Limitation on Exclusive Rights, Fair Use, 13 HOUSTON L. REv.
1041, 1042-46 (1976).
2. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§
1-216 (1976).
3. See Selkirk, Copyright Act of 1976, 49 Nsw YORK STATE B.J. 558, 558 (1977);
Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 477, 479
(1977).
At the time of the drafting of the 1909 Act, radio, television, phonographs, and
even motion pictures were not yet known. Subsequently the Townsend Amendment
of 1912 revised section 5 of the 1909 Act to provide copyright protection for motion
pictures. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5, 37 Stat. 488 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5
(1970)). The Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15, 1972 - Jan. 1, 1975), dealt with the problems of
record piracy. At the time of the revision, the 1909 Act dealt with sound recordings
and juke boxes and motion pictures. However, the 1909 Act did not deal at all with
areas such as cable television and photocopying.
4. The 1976 Act contained specific provisions regarding photocopying (§ 108)
and cable television (§ 111) but did not specifically deal with audiovisual recording of
television broadcasts for home use. Nor did it make specific provisions for computers.
See notes 7-10 and accompanying text infra.
5. The term VTR is an abbreviation for video tape recording and includes vari-
ous video systems: videotapes, videodiscs, videocassettes. The Betamax machine
which underlies the suit in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480
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fact that such technology was known at the time Congress en-
acted the 1976 Act.'
In legislating the new copyright statute, Congress dealt
with new forms of technology in three ways. Specific exemp-
tions were enacted to cover some activities7 while others8 were
left entirely to resolution by the general "fair use" defense,
and some areas were covered partially by specific exemptions
and partially by fair use.10
Congress, through the 1976 Act, made the first statutory
provision for the judicially created doctrine of fair use.11 Sec-
tion 1071" provides that "fair use of a copyrighted work. . . is
F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), is but one type of VTR system. In particular, the
Betamax enables television owners to record broadcasts for later replay on their own
sets. As presently manufactured, the viewer may delete commercials or skip them
when replaying by using the "pause switch" or "fast-forward switch" respectively.
The user may record the program he is watching, or may record on one channel while
viewing another, or he may set the Betamax to record while he is not at home. Id. at
435. See note 19 infra.
6. Progenitor models of the Betamax have been manufactured since 1965.
7. For instance, exemption for reproduction by libraries is found in § 108; ex-
emptions of certain types of performances are found in § 110; secondary transmission
exemptions are found in § 111; ephemeral recordings are dealt with in § 112.
The concepts of exemption and fair use should not be confused. An exemption is
an express statutory provision which removes an activity from the scope of copyright
protection. Fair use is a non-infringement of an otherwise protected area. See L.
SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 17 (1978).
8. Audiovisual tape recording (VTR) is left entirely to fair use apart from spe-
cific instances where it is expressly excluded from other exemptions. See, e.g., §
112(a), § 110(1), § 108(h), and § 108(f)(3) which grants an exemption for reproduction
of audiovisual news programs to libraries and archives. Similarly § 117 freezes copy-
right protection with respect to computers to the law in effect December 31, 1977. In
addition, all forms of technology yet to be discovered are left to fair use. See note 16
and accompanying text infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 36-172 infra.
10. While § 108 deals with reprography, it does so only in the context of librar-
ies and archives. Thus, while reproduction for archival purposes is covered by specific
exemption all other areas of reprography not covered by § 108 are left to fair use. For
instance, photocopying by educators is dealt with by the fair use doctrine. However,
specific guidelines exist for classroom copying and for educational uses of music. See
H. R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 66-72 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House
REPORT].
11. See M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1980); A. LATMAN, THE
COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 ACT 204 (5th ed.
1979); Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IowA L. REV.
832, 832 (1968); Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT
5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Latman Study]; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65.
See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1978).
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not an infringement of copyright.""" The statute provides an
illustrative list of permissible* uses1 4 as well as an illustrative
list of guidelines15 for determining which non-enumerated
uses should be considered fair. The revisers contemplated that
this doctrine of fair use would be both sufficiently general and
sufficiently specific to deal with new technologies not yet con-
templated16 as well as some already-known technologies such
as VTR, with which the statute did not deal completely or at
all.17
This article will discuss the potential liability for audio-
visual tape recording of television broadcasts for home use
under the Copyright Act of 1976 and concludes that such use
cannot be considered a fair use as presently practiced.
It is further contended that recent decisions-namely
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States's and Universal
City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America" (Betamax)-have
13. Id. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra.
14. The statute reads: "including such use by reproduction in copies or pho-
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research ...." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1978).
The word "including" is defined in § 101 as "illustrative and not limitative." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. II 1978). See M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-56; A. LATMAN,
supra note 11, at 204-05; HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65. See notes 67-74 and
accompanying text infra.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1978). See notes 114-15 and accompanying text
infra. The list of factors is preceded by the word "include," which indicates an illus-
trative list. See note 14 supra.
16. HousE REP ORT, supra note 10, at 66.
17. Id. See notes 8 & 10 and accompanying text supra.
18. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). The copyright infringement suit was brought under the Copyright Act of 1909
by a publisher of medical journals alleging that two government institutions, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (a government medical research organization) and the Na-
tional Library of Medicine had infringed its copyrights by making photocopies of ar-
ticles in its medical journals. The Court of Claims held the copying to be fair use. The
court based its decision on eight criteria: plaintiff did not show substantial economic
harm, medicine and medical research would be injured if the photocopying were held
to be an infringement, the matter called for legislative solution, the defendants were
non-profit institutions, copying was restricted, library photocopying was a longstand-
ing practice, doubt existed as to the meaning of "copy" under the 1909 Act, and the
practice in foreign countries required such a holding. Id. at 1353-62.
19. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See note 5 supra. The district court held
that noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast via the public airwaves
to television sets is not an infringement of either the Copyright Act of 1909 or the
1976 Act because it was fair use. The suit was brought by Universal City Studios, Inc.
and Walt Disney Productions, owners of copyrighted audiovisual material, against the
manufacturers, distributors, advertisers, and retailers of the "Betamax" videotape re-
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made fundamental errors in applying the doctrine of fair use
to new forms of technology which could set unfortunate prece-
dents for all newly-developed forms of technology which im-
pinge on copyright law. Unless corrected, these decisions will
ultimately deprive copyright holders of their recognized prop-
erty rights which will in turn deprive society of progress in the
arts and sciences.
II. THE INFRINGEMENT ISSUE: BETAMAX AND THE COPYRIGHT
ACT OF 1976
The basic issue to resolve in applying copyright law to
new forms of technology, such as audiovisual recording, is
whether or not the given use creates an infringement" of the
relevant Copyright Act. However, before a court need consider
whether a copyright infringement has occurred, certain pre-
liminary requisites must be established.
The first question is whether or not the material at issue
was copyrightable. Motion pictures were added to coverage of
the 1909 Act in 191221 and are listed in section 102(a)(6) 22 as
subject matter of the 1976 Act. Therefore, the material under-
lying the Betamax suit is copyrightable under both acts.
Assuming a work is copyrightable the next issue is, does
valid copyright protection exist. Under both acts notice of
copyright is required upon publication." Notice must "give
reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. ' 2 4 The Betamax
court did not discuss the issue of whether valid notice of copy-
right was placed on the material broadcasted, but a question
arises whether the plaintiffs made a good faith effort at rea-
sonable notice. Is the © symbol with year and owner of the
corder as well as one individual defendant. 480 F. Supp. at 432.
20. "Infringement" is not defined in the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. II
1978). Nor was it defined under the 1909 Act. Rather than defining infringement, the
statute specified the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. See Latman Study,
supra note 11, at 1.
21. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5, 37 Stat. 488 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5
(1970)), known as the Townsend Amendment of 1912. Movies were listed as copy-
rightable in § 5(1) and § 5(m) of the 1909 Act. See note 3 supra.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. II 1978). Similarly § 10 of the 1909 Act required
notice of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. 11 1978). The 1976 Act is more liberal than the




copyright of reasonable size in relation to a viewer's television
screen, as opposed to when blown-up on a movie theatre
screen? It would not be burdensome to copyright holders to
incorporate a "still" of enlarged copyright notice within any
material released for television broadcasting. Because un-
copyrighted material such as live performances could legiti-
mately be recorded with a Betamax, 5 it is important to give
the public reasonable notice of what is copyrighted1 6
Other requisites to a plaintiff's claim of copyright in-
fringement are that plaintiff held title to the copyright2V7 and
had standing to sue.' 8 Of particular relevance here is that
under the 1976 Act, the owner of any exclusive right in the
work is treated as a copyright owner and has standing to
sue. 2
Assuming a valid copyright exists, a court must next ad-
dress the issue of infringement. To find infringement of either
Act an exclusive right granted the copyright owner under the
relevant statute must have been violated.
Section 106 of the 1976 Act 0 grants to a copyright holder
exclusive rights of reproduction, derivation, distribution, per-
formance, and display. Infringement occurs when one of these
25. Any program not "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression is not copy-
rightable. "A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted,
is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultane-
ously with its transmission." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. II 1978). The work must be
"fixed" "by or under the authority of the author." Id. Thus many "live" television
performances may not be copyrighted, e.g., coverage of presidential news conferences.
However, under § 301, the preemption section, those programs not covered by the
Copyright Act of 1976 are governed by state statutes or common law, where
applicable.
26. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(c), 405 (Supp. II 1978); 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 19-21 (1970);
note 24 supra.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (Supp. II 1978); M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-3 to 13-
5; A. LATMAN, supra note 11, at 94.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (Supp. II 1978). The Betamax defendants argued that
the suit was a collusive one. Defendants' Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and
Law (Trial Memorandum) at 196, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America, 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The only defendant who made actual
home use of the Betamax to record plaintiffs' movies after January 1, 1978 and thus
could be liable under the 1976 Act, Griffith, was a client of plaintiff's law firm. Id. at
195-96. However, a genuine controversy does exist between plaintiff and defendant
and the court was correct in reaching the merits of the suit. See Comment, Betamax
and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1184 n.16.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (Supp. II 1978). The concept of indivisibility has been
abolished. Under the Copyright Act of 1909 if plaintiff did not hold title to all rights
in the work he was deemed a mere licensee and could not sue.
30. Id. § 106.
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exclusive rights is violated. The rights of reproduction s' and
derivation" are particularly implicated by VTR copying.
Under the 1976 Act "copies" are defined as "material ob-
jects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which
the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a. machine or de-
vice .... "s Thus, a VTR tape is a "copy" under the 1976 Act
31. Id. § 106(1). This section confers an exclusive right "to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies or phonorecords."
32. Id. § 106(2). A right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copy-
righted work" is stated.
33. Id. § 101.
Under the 1909 staute "copy" meant a version of the work which a user could
directly perceive without any special equipment. The 1909 Act reincorporated the
holding of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), that
the piano rolls involved in the suit were not "copies" and therefore did not infringe
the composer's copyright in the underlying work. The Court's rationale was that the
rolls were unintelligible without the machine. Id. at 13. See M. NIMMER, supra note
11, § 25-3; Comment, The Copyright Act of 1976: Home Use of Audiovisual Record-
ing and Presentation Systems, 58 NEs. L. Rav. 467, 471 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Nebraska Note]. The same reasoning was applied to deny copyright protection for
material incorporated in phonograph records and therefore necessitated the Sound
Recording Amendment of 1971. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391
(effective Feb. 15, 1972 - Jan. 1, 1975). See Capitol Records Inc. v. Mercury Records,
221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 35.21 n.57; note 3 supra &
note 92 infra and accompanying text.
Videotape is not decipherable to the naked eye and therefore is not a "copy"
under the 1909 Act. Since videotapes are not "copies," despite the copyrightability of
the underlying subject matter, there is no infringement of § 1(a) of the 1909 Act.
A distinction must be made between "copy" when used in conjunction with an
infringement of the 1909 Act versus when used to denote a copyrightable material
under the 1909 Act. The two are not synonymous. An argument has been made that
VTR software is not copyrightable under the 1909 Act. See Comment, The Copyright
Act of 1976: Home Use of Audiovisual Recording and Presentation Systems, 58 NEn.
L. Rzv. 467, 471-72 (1979). However, the issue in Betamax, as in any copyright in-
fringement suit, is not whether the material created by copying (VTR software) is
copyrightable but whether the material copied from (movies) is copyrightable. Movies
were clearly copyrightable under § 5(1) and § 5(m) of the 1909 Act. See notes 3 & 21
and accompanying text supra.
In fact, videotape itself is copyrightable under the 1909 Act. The Copyright Of-
fice has registered magnetic videotape under § 5(1) and § 5(m) of the 1909 Act since
1961. See Colby, An Historic "First"-Copyright Office Accepts Magnetic Video
Tape for Registration, 8 BuLL. CoPYIowr Soc'Y 205 (1961). However, irrespective of
whether or not videotape is copyrightable under the 1909 Act, VTR does not create
"copies" which infringe § 1(a) as the term "copy" with respect to § 1(a) exclusive
rights has come to mean.
One author has argued that Betamax recording might violate § 1(d) as well as §
1(a) of the 1909 Act. Note, Copyright: The Betamax Case, 10 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 203,
210-14 (1978). Section 1(d) confers an exclusive right "to make or to procure the
making of any transcription or record." 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1970). The author draws an
1981] BETAMAX
and a VTR user infringes section 106(1) when he reproduces a
copyrighted work on tape. Furthermore, if the viewer makes
deletions or other modifications while recording the original
copyrighted work, a derivative work" is created, and an in-
fringement of section 106(2) occurs." Thus, two possible in-
fringements occur through VTR use, and the fair use defense
becomes crucial.
III. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
A. Fair Use Is an Undefined Term
Fair use was a judicially-created doctrine codified for the
first time in section 107 of the 1976 Act.86 Section 107, unal-
tered from prior case law, -contains no definition of the con-
cept of fair use3 7 but merely contains illustrative lists of per-
missible uses8 and guidelines s' for construing the doctrine.
The code states clearly, however, that fair use is non-infringe-
ment and not excused infringement.0
Various definitions have been offered by commentators. 1
analogy to Walt Disney Productions v. Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969), where videotaping for delayed replay on cable television in
Alaska of a copyrighted motion picture televised by stations in Seattle and Tacoma,
Washington was held to infringe § 1(d) rights. See also Holland, The Audiovisual
Package: Handle with Care, 22 BuLL. COPYUGHT Soc'v 104, 106 & 122 (1974).
This article will discuss infringement under the 1976 Act only. Thus the issue of
fair use need not be reached in reference to the 1909 Act.
34. "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a ... motion picture version ... or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions.., or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'deriva-
tive work'." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. II 1978).
35. Sections 106(3), 106(4), and 106(5) all involve public activities and are thus
not germane to the issue of non-commercial home use. The sections grant the copy-
right holder exclusive rights of public distribution, performance, and display. 17
U.S.C. § 106(3) - (5) (Supp. II 1978).
36. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. The concept of fair use was first
introduced by Mr. Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841). See note 115 infra.
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1978) as well as 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. II
1978); L. SmT=a, supra note 7, at 19; Freid, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. Rav. 497, 497 n.4 (1977).
38. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
39. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1978). See notes 46-49 and accompanying text
infra.
41. Fair use has been defined as "a use technically forbidden by the law, but
allowed as reasonable and customary, on the theory that the author must have fore-
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One analysis argues that fair use is a "privilege in other than
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent. . . ."' As an equita-
ble doctrine based on reasonableness, fair use depends on the
facts of each case.43
B. The Burden of Proof on the Issue of Fair Use
The burden of proof question in fair use cases has been a
confusing one. The courts in both Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States" and the Betamax case45 assumed that theplaintiff was obligated to prove that defendant's actions were
not fair use and hence were led to decide against the respec-
tive plaintiffs in both cases. An argument can be made, how-
ever, that defendant has the burden of proving fair use.
While the revisers of the Copyright Act did not intend to
change the case law when they codified the concept of fair
use,41 the statement in section 107 that "fair use. . . is not an
infringement of copyright"' 7 arguably altered the prior judi-
cial view that fair use was a defense which excused an infring-
seen it and tacitly consented to it." DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143(1925), quoted in Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, ASCAP COPYRIGHT L.
SyMP. 43, 45 (1955). Crossland defines fair use as "privileged use of copyrighted mate-
rial without express license." Crossland, The Rise and Fall of Fair Use: The Protec-
tion of Literary Materials Against Copyright Infringement by New and Developing
Media, 20 S. CAL. L. REV. 153, 160 (1968). Finally, a paraphrase of the Golden Rule
is: "Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you would be
resentful if they so took from you." McDonald, Non-Infringing Uses, 9 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'Y 466, 467 (1962), quoted in M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-58.
Fair use is not the copying of the theme or ideas rather than their expression.
This erroneous definition was coined by Judge Learned Hand in Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).For other definitions of fair use see REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1961).
42. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 125 (1944).
43. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013(1978); Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Latman Study, supra note 11, at 5; HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 10, at 65.
44. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). See note 18 supra.
45. 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). See note 19 supra.
46. See A. LATMAN, supra note 11, at 205; M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-54;
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 66. See notes 11 and 36 and accompanying text
supra.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1978).
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ing use.48 If fair use is viewed as a defense, or a form of ex-
cused infringement, the burden of proof lies with the
defendant. However, by stating that a fair use is noninfringe-
ment, it can be argued that the burden of proof lies with the
plaintiff.4"
Some commentators have argued that the allocation of
the burden of proof is immaterial.50 They argue that in most
copyright cases the trier-of-fact is a judge and therefore the
burden of persuasion is of less importance than it would be
before a jury. They further argue that a judge is unlikely to
find all other factors so evenly balanced that the burden of
proof on the fair use issue will be determinative. 1
Nevertheless, whether from a purely theoretical point of
view or because in close cases the allocation of the burden of
proof may be decisive, the issue of the burden of proof is an
important one. Most of the noted commentators view fair use
as a defense.5 ' However, others have argued that the plaintiff
should bear the burden of proof,' while one Congressional re-
48. Numerous commentators have viewed fair use as a defense. Nimmer treats
fair use as a defense in his treatise and states that "fair use is a defense not because
of the absence of substantial similarity but rather despite the fact that the similarity
is substantial." M. NIMmE, supra note 11, at 13-56. Similarly, Latman refers to the
"defense of fair use." Latman Study, supra note 11, at 7. THE HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 10, at 65, states that "[t]he claim that a defendant's acts constituted a fair use
rather than an infringement has been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright
actions over the years. . . ." Other commentators have also viewed fair use as a de-
fense. Cohen, supra note 41, at 47 n.23; Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment:
A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYIGHT L. Symp. 43, 50 (1971); Rosenfield, Cus-
tomary Use As "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 119, 121 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenfield I].
49. Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251
(W.D. N.Y. 1978). See also Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use"
in Copyright Law, 50 NoTRz DAm LAW., 790, 804 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rosen-
field II]; Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. Rv.
573, 607 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Home Videorecording]; Note, Copyright: Limita-
tion on Exclusive Rights, Fair Use, 13 Hous. L. REv. 1041, 1059-60 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Houston Note].
50. See Note, Copyright Fair Use - Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DuKE L. J.
73, 106 n.188 [hereinafter cited as 1969 Duke Note]. See also Crossland, supra note
41, at 160 n.50; Latman Study, supra note 11, at 6; Note, Fair Use: A Controversial
Topic in the Latest Revision of Our Copyright Law, 34 U. CINCINNATI L. REv. 73, 76
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Controversial Topic].
51. 1969 Duke Note, supra note 50, at 106-07 n.188.
52. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
53. Rosenfield II, supra note 49, at 807. Educators have argued that the burden
of proof in a fair use case should be on the plaintiff. Hearings on S. 597 Before the
Subcom. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1967).
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port stated that "any special statutory provision placing the
burden of proving fair use on one side or the other would be
unfair and undesirable."' A resolution of the controversy is
necessary.
Because the codification of fair use was not intended to
change preexisting case law,"5 one can argue that the burden
of proof must lie with the defendant irrespective of the state-
ment that fair use is non-infringement. Under this reasoning
the Betamax court misinterpreted the law by placing the fair
use proof burden on plaintiffs.
IV. AUDIOVISUAL TAPE RECORDING OF TELEVISION
BROADCASTS FOR HOME USE PURPOSES Is NOT A FAIR USE
A. The Purpose of the Fair Use Doctrine and the Lack of
Countervailing Societal Interest Support the Copyright
Holder's Rights in the Betamax Case
The theory behind the copyright law is that authors and
other originators of copyrightable works will be encouraged to
create by the economic incentive of a copyright "monopoly. '"1
The increased output of works of the intellect will in turn in-
ure to the public's benefit. However, strict construction of the
copyright laws in some instances would impede the "Progress
of Science and useful Arts'"1 by hindering a second work. The
fair use doctrine is therefore applied when the societal inter-
est in promoting second works or widening dissemination of
first works outweighs the financial interest of the copyright
holder. 8 The doctrine reflects the judgment that, while the
54. H. R. REP. No. 88, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 37 (1967).
55. See notes 36 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
56. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Supreme Court stated: "The eco-
nomic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copy-
rights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in 'Science and the Useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered." Id. at 219.
The copyright scheme is authorized by the constitutional grant "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. S.
58. Wainright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). The philosophy of the copyright
system in this country was initially expressed in the English case of Sayre v. Moore, 1
East 361, 102 Eng. Rep. 139 n.140 (K.B. 1785):
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copyright system seems to exist for the benefit of the "au-
thor," the ultimate purpose of copyright is to benefit society. 5'
For a fair use privilege to be found, a greater value to the
public must be found to override the copyright holder's inter-
est. "The Progress of Science and useful Arts" 60 is not pro-
moted unless the underlying actions broaden dissemination of
knowledge or serve some other intellectual use. Without this
countervailing societal interest there is no need to apply the
equitable doctrine of fair use to override the copyright
holder's exclusive rights.
Thus in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States' a key
factor considered by the court was whether medical research
would be hampered if fair use were not found. Similarly, other
fair use cases involved balancing some artistic or literary value
against the rights of a copyright owner. Encyclopedia Britan-
nica Educational Corp. v. Crooks'2 and Wihtol v. Crow6e both
involved education. Rosemont Enterprises v. Random
House," Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,e and Meero-
We must take care to guard against the two extremes equally preju-
dicial; the one that men of ability, who have employed their time for the
service of the community may not be deprived of their just merits and
reward for their ingenuity and labor; the other that the world may not
be deprived of improvements nor the progress of the arts retarded.
See L. SELTZER, supra note 7, at 13-14; Cohen, supra note 41, at 49-50; Comment,
Copyright Implications Attendant Upon the Use of Home Videotape Recorders, 13
U. RICHMOND L. REv. 279, 289 (1979) [hereinafter cited as VTR Implications].
59. "[Clourts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasion-
ally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the
greater public interest in the development of art, science and industry." Rosemont
Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967) (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)). Similarly, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954),
held: "The copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."
Id. at 219. See L. SELTZER, supra note 7, at 8-10. See also REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REvISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909); Crossland, supra note
41, at 163-65, 215.
While the United States copyright scheme is predicated on the superior interest
of the public, the concept of copyright originated in England as a device for the pro-
tection of publishers. Early state statutes in this country served primarily to protect
authors. See Houston Note, supra note 49, at 1046. See note 1 supra.
60. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See note 56 supra.
61. 487 F.2d at 1354.
62. 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
63. 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1963).
64. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
65. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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pol v. Nizer" involved creation of a book incorporating mate-
rial from plaintiff's copyrighted work. Other traditional areas
for fair use have been hand-copying for private use by re-
searchers and scholars, 7 quotations for use in criticism or re-
view,68 incidental use,69 parodyo7 0 summary or brief quotation
for use in news reports,'7 reproduction for use in legislative orjudicial proceedings or reports,7" reproduction of a portion by
a library to replace a damaged copy,78 and quotation of short
passages for illustration of a scholar's observations .7
The Betamax court failed to adequately address the lack
of a compelling countervailing societal interest against which
to weigh copyright protection. On the facts of the Betamax
66. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
67. There has been an absence of litigation in this area. See Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d at 1353; M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-80, 81;
Latman Study, supra note 11, at 11-12. Care must be taken not to confuse what is
customary use with fair use. Cohen, supra note 41, at 51-52. Contra, Rosenfield I,
supra note 48, at 119. See also note 141 and accompanying text infra.
68. See HOUSE REP ORT, supra note 10, at 65; M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-
64. The absence of reported cases in this area may be due to the authors' desire to
encourage review of their works. Latman Study, supra note 11, at 8-9. See, e.g., Law-
rence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, No. 8136 (C.C. Mass. 1869); Robert Stigwood Group,
Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972); Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior
Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Consumers Union of United States v.
Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
69. The HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65 lists "incidental and fortuitous
reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located in the scene of an event
being reported." See Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-72; Latman Study, supra note 11,
at 8-9; Cohen, supra note 41, at 58-59.
70. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65. See, e.g., Loew's Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131
F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Hill v. Whalen &
Martell, 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). See M. NiMumt, supra note 11, at 13-66 to 13-70;
Latman Study, supra note 11, at 9-10; Cohen, supra note 41, at 54-57.
71. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65; H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall Street
Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); A. LArsus, supra note 11, at 208-09; Latman
Study, supra note 11, at 12. In the area of news reports conflicts between copyright
protection and First Amendment rights will be especially crucial. See note 75 infra.
72. HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 65. See M. NiMMER, supra note 11, at 13-
71; Latman Study, supra note 11, at 13.
73. House REPORT, supra note 10, at 65. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(c) (Supp. II 1978)
which now makes this an exemption where a replacement is unavailable rather than
leaving it to fair use (but note that § 106(f)(4) states that rights of fair use are
preserved).
74. Hous. REPORT, supra note 10, at 65. See Latman Study, supra note 11, at
10-11; A. LATMAN, supra note 11, at 206-07; But see Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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case, plaintiffs' movies were the copyrighted works which were
the basis of the alleged infringement. These movies are viewed
primarily for their entertainment value. Because fair use is
grounded on the dissemination of knowledge and progress of
art and science, and not on entertainment, it is difficult to jus-
tify the copyright infringements involved in Betamax as fair
use. 
7
While it can be argued that VTR recordings can be made
of documentaries and other educational television shows, and
thereby be used to broaden dissemination of knowledge, the
solution proposed by this article76 would not preclude maxi-
mum dissemination of such knowledge. It promotes broad ac-
cess to all televised works, whether copyrighted or not, but
also ensures that copyright holders will be awarded their
property rights."
B. The Legislative History of the Copyright Act of 1976 As
Well As the Act Itself Do Not Indicate that VTR Is a Fair
Use
The Copyright Act of 1976 makes no explicit provision
for audiovisual recording for home use, despite the fact that
75. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See
note 58 and accompanying text supra. Entertainment is not a purpose which sup-
ports fair use under the copyright law of the United States. See S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1975); VTR Implications, supra note 58, at 289; Note, Copyright
- The Home Video Recording Controversy, 81 W. VA. L. Rzv. 231, 238-39 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Video Controversy]; Note, Copyright: The Betamax Case, 10 U.
TOLEDO L. REV. 203, 229 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Betamax Note]. However, Por-
tuguese law has granted a privilege for recreational use. See Latman Study, supra
note 11, at 24-25.
While recent years have seen the development of the idea that "public interest in
the free dissemination of information," Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), is a factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether a fair use exists, constitutional implications are not
strong in the Betamax suit. The material which underlies the suit is primarily of
entertainment value and not educational. 480 F. Supp. at 452. See Meeropol v. Nizer,
361 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F.
Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amend-
ment, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 983 (1970); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 1180 (1970);
Rosenfield II, supra note 49; Sobel, supra note 48; Video Controversy, supra at 238-
40; Note, Constitutional Fair Use, 20 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 85 (1978). See also note
71 supra.
76. See notes 198-207 and accompanying text infra.
77. Id.
1981]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
VTR technology was already known at the time."' However,
the references to audiovisual recording made in the Act indi-
cate a Congressional intent to give audiovisual work greater
protection than other forms of copyrighted material.7 9 The
Betamax court concluded that the legislative history of the
new Act indicated a Congressional intention not to include
home use of off-the-air recording of audiovisual materials
within a copyright owner's monopoly. 0 The court's analogy to
home-use sound taping from broadcasts is not, however,
persuasive.
The fact that Congress established only limited copyright
protection for owners of sound recordings and permitted
home audio recording for private, non-commercial use from
broadcasts," does not necessarily determine whether Congress
intended a similar treatment for audiovisual material.8' The
circumstances surrounding sound recording and audiovisual
recordings are sufficiently different that treatment of the two
need not be parallel under the 1976 Act. In particular, the
treatment of sound recording was based less on copyright the-
ory than on the practical reality of inability to police home
use of sound recordings.8 The basis of the exemption for
home sound recording was that the practice was "common
and unrestrained" by then and too difficult to control." How-
ever, methods of control of audiovisual taping exist s5 which,
while not adaptable to audiorecording, preserve the constitu-
tional mandate of promoting "progress of Science and the use-
ful Arts" without impinging any first amendment rights to
78. See notes 4-8 and accompanying text supra.
79. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(h), 110(1), 112(a) (Supp. II 1978), which all spe-
cifically exclude audiovisual material from exemptions granted by the 1976 Copyright
Act. See note 8 supra.
80. 480 F. Supp. at 443.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (Supp. II 1978).
82. See Note, The Betamax Case: Accommodating Public Access and Economic
Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. Rav. 243, 247, n.18 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Stanford Note]; Home Videorecording, supra note 49, at 601.
83. "[Home sound recording] is common and unrestrained today." H.R. REP.
No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sesa. 7, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1566, 1572. Similarly, the Assistant Register of Copyrights stated: "You simply can-
not control it." Hearings on S. 646 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judici-
ary Comm. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (June 9, and 10, 1971) (Statement of Barbara
Ringer), quoted in, 480 F. Supp. at 445.
84. 480 F. Supp. at 444-45. See note 83 supra.
85. See notes 198-207 and accompanying text infra.
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privacy and to receive information s' or fourth amendment
rights to be secure in one's home.s1
Several distinctions between VTR and audiorecording es-
tablish that no analogy can be drawn between the two for cop-
yright purposes. While sound recording was too widespread at
the time the statute was enacted to control it,"s audiovisual
recording has not as yet spread to the same extent.89 Sec-
ondly, the tape recorders and tapes used to record sound off
the air have independent uses which are beneficial to society
and commerce, such as dictation or private taping of events
one wishes to memorialize. Thus any limitation imposed on
their availability would be to the detriment of other useful
functions. In particular, this is true for self-erasing tapes.' 0
The Betamax, and similar devices, however, have as their pri-
mary function recording audiovisual material off the air, i.e.,
recording of material not original to the user. While individu-
als may derive enjoyment from creating a library of individu-
ally recorded videotapes, no direct benefit accrues to society.
Furthermore, the combined availability of prerecorded video-
cassettes, videodiscs, movie rentals, and television reruns pro-
vides alternative permanent sources for the material VTR
generates while not depriving copyright owners of their fair
reward.
A third distinction between VTR and audiorecording is
the fact that record producers and performers were in no dif-
ferent position by the exemption of home-use audiorecording
from the copyright statute than they had previously been, 1
86. See note 75 supra.
87. The proposed solution, notes 198-207 and accompanying text infra, involves
no intrusions on the sanctity of the home. However, as the Betamax opinion states:
"Not all activity is made legal by virtue of occurring in a private home." 480 F. Supp.
at 446. Thus other solutions which might involve monitoring VTR use in private
homes should not be automatically discarded. Utility companies make periodic entry
into private homes to ascertain the quantity of use. Nor does society countenance
illegal acts merely because they occur in private.
88. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra.
89. The statement of Rep. Kastenmeier to the contrary, is one of opinion and
not of fact. 480 F. Supp. at 446. The statement was made on the House floor during
debate on the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment which did not reach audiovisual
recording. Id. at 445-46. See also Stanford Note, aupra note 82, at 247 n.18.
90. See note 200 and accompanying text infra.
91. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 7, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1566, 1572, quoted in 480 F. Supp. at 444. This House Report
which accompanied the 1971 Sound Recording Amendment stated: "[R]ecord produc-
ers and performers would be in no different position from that of the owners of copy-
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since the 1909 Copyright Act had offered them no protec-
tion." However, since movies were specifically made copy-
rightable under the old act,'3 denying them protection from
VTR copying puts their copyright owners in a substantially
different position.
A fourth flaw in analogizing the treatment of audiorecord-
ing to VTR under the copyright law arises when the concept
of fair use is confused with that of exemptions4 from the copy-
right act. The Betamax case does not raise an issue that a
specific exemption for home use of VTR exists under the
Copyright Act(s). Rather, the question is whether VTR for
home use is a fair use. While the language of section 106(4) is
modified with respect to sound recordings by section 114(a)91
to explicitly exempt off-the-air sound recordings for noncom-
mercial private use, no such explicit provision was made for
audiovisual materials despite the fact that science had by
then developed the VTR capability. Thus no specific exemp-
tion for home use of VTR was made and none should be
implied."
The Betamax court cited the treatment of home sound
recordings to establish that the language of section 106 is not
always to be construed literally.1 However, the court glossed
over the fact that the modification of the language in section
106(4) with respect to sound recordings is made by other ex-
plicit language in the statute. Moreover, section 106 states
that the section is "[slubject to sections 107 through 118." 8
Nothing in sections 107 through 118 creates an exemption for
VTR. There is thus no reason to read the language of section
106 to mean anything other than it states when determining
the validity of home-use recording of audiovisual material.
A fifth distinction between audiorecording and audiovi-
sual recording lies in the different effect each has on the audi-
ence. While a viewer's appetite for audiovisual material may
be exhausted by viewing the tape several times, people have
right in recorded musical compositions over the past 20 years." Id.
92. See note 33 supra.
93. 17 U.S.C. §§ 5(1), (m) (1970). See note 3 supra.
94. See note 7 supra.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (Supp. II 1978).
96. See note 111 and accompanying text infra.
97. 480 F. Supp. at 443.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. II 1978).
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been known to listen to records hundreds of times and still
enjoy them.ee Thus VTR recording for home use is more likely
to reduce the rerun market 00 for televised films and other au-
diovisual material than home audiotaping hurts record sales.
In fact, repeated playing of an audio recording may induce the
listener to buy the record, or generally enhance the listener's
desire to hear the recording repeated.101 "Indeed, radio is the
basic marketing tool for sound recordings .... -102
A sixth distinction between audiotaping and VTR is that
the materials copied by VTR require greater copyright protec-
tion than do materials which are purely sound.10 As one com-
mentator has noted,
The pirating user of a motion picture .. .appropriates
not merely the plot and dialogue, but also 'the best and
only production containing the services of artists and ac-
tors otherwise unavailable, [and] can give unlimited iden-
tical performances in any place for any gathering, which
compete with and destroy the value of the work for the
copyright owner and his legitimate exhibition licensees.'"
The costs of producing a movie involve not only the creation
99. See Holland, The Audiovisual Package: Handle with Care, 22 BULL. Copy-
RIGHT Soc'Y f04, 132 (1974); Note, "Disk-Television": Some Recurring Copyright
Problems in the Reproduction and Performance of Motion Pictures, 34 U. Cm. L.
REv. 686, 694-99 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Disk-Television]; Home Videorecording,
supra note 49, at 601.
Nor is there any contradiction between the fact that plaintiffs complain that
Betamax owners are recording their movies for "librarying" while plaintiffs allege
that the public's "visual boredom" precludes repeated viewings of audiovisual works.
For a Betamax owner may "library" something shown on television and yet only
replay it once, or at most a few times. Plaintiffs' economic injury arises from the fact
that they are denied financial reward from the limited repeat viewing which is di-
verted from movie theatres, television reruns, or sale of videodiscs. Furthermore, the
public will view a movie at most a few times while it will listen to a sound recording
many times.
100. Producers of televised shows depend heavily on the rerun market for prof-
its. See Stanford Note, supra note 82, at 247; Home Videorecording, supra note 49,
at 601; Nebraska Note, supra note 33, at 469-70 n.10.
101. Home Videorecording, supra note 49, at 601.
102. Holland, supra note 99, at 131. Furthermore, the difference in quality of
sound between a home audiorecording and a professionally recorded version can more
significantly affect the listener's enjoyment than the poorer quality of a home audio-
visual recording.
103. See Holland, supra note 99, at 131; Disk-Television, supra note 99, at 694-
99; Nebraska Note, supra note 33, at 469-70 n.10; Stanford Note, supra note 82, at
247. See generally Home Videorecording, supra note 49, at 574-83.
104. Disk-Television, supra note 99, at 695.
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or purchase of the screenplay, but the costs of the scenery,
actors and actresses, production staff, costumes, musicians,
advertising and promotion, as well as the costs of financing a
"risky" venture.108
Finally, the legislative history of the Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971106 cannot be construed to endorse home
use audiovisual recording. The Betamax opinion relies on
statements of Ms. Ringer, the Register of Copyright, and Rep.
Kastenmeier, made without any factual support, indicating'0
their concern that home recording of audiovisual material
could not be controlled or would involve an invasion of the
sanctity of the home. The opinion of the Copyright Office that
home recording off-the-air of audiovisual materials should not
be a copyright infringement ' "s is not determinative. Opinions
expressed at committee hearings, though aids to determining
ambiguous intent, unless incorporated into the statute itself
are not binding law.10' The language of the statute did not
confer an analogous limitation on copyrights of audiovisual re-
cordings to that for sound recordings, and legislative history is
relevant only where the plain meaning of the statute is not
clear.110 Moreover, the fact that the issue was raised at legisla-
tive hearings indicates that the drafters were aware of the
problem, but chose not to take affirmative statutory action at
the time. This fact strongly implies that no special treatment
was intended."'
105. The costs of producing a motion picture can far outdistance the production
costs of "cutting" a record. See Disk-Television, supra note 99, at 694-99; note 79
and accompanying text supra.
106. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (effective Feb. 15,
1972 until Jan. 1, 1975). See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 7 reprinted in
[1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 1566.
107. 480 F. Supp. at 445-46. See notes 83-84, 88-89 and accompanying text
supra.
108. 480 F. Supp. at 446.
109. McCaugh v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1931); Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Duquesne Warehouse Co., 149 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1945), affd,
326 U.S. 446 (1946).
110. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913,
921 (9th Cir. 1975).
111. In fact, a strong argument can be made that by excluding "sounds accom-
panying a motion picture or other audiovisual work," 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 111978),
from the definition of "sound recordings" in the Copyright Act of 1976 Congress in-
tended to create two completely distinct categories of copyrighted material. The in-
ference arises that Congress intended to treat the two areas differently. Similarly, the
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 was never intended to apply to sound accom-
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Though various statements from the legislative history
seemingly support defendant, numerous other statements can
be quoted in support of plaintiffs.112 For instance, the state-
ment that "[t]he committee does not intend to suggest, how-
ever, that off-the-air recording for convenience would under
any circumstances, be considered 'fair use' """ clearly sup-
ports the plaintiffs' position and tends to negate Congres-
sional intent to provide fair use protection for VTR devices.
In conclusion, isolated quotations from the legislative his-
tory of the Act are not determinative where the language of
the statute itself is clear. Congress, though fully aware of the
home audiovisual recording problem, chose not to exempt
such use from the copyright laws. It thus cannot be said that
VTR use is an exempt use or is a fair use.
C. Applying the Guidelines Suggested in the Statute Indi-
cates that VTR Is Not Fair Use
Section 107 of the Act lists114 four key factors which
should be included
[i]n determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use...
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commerical nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work. 15
panying motion pictures. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6, reprinted in
[19711 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1566, 1570 [hereinafter cited as 1971 House
REPORT]. See Video Controversy, supra note 75, at 246.
112. E.g., "(I]f there is an unauthorized reproduction of the sound portion of a
copyrighted television program fixed on video tape, a suit for copyright infringement
could be sustained.. ." 1971 House REPORT, supra note 111, at 1571.
113. SEN. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
114. This list is illustrative and not exclusive. See notes 14-15 and accompany-
ing text supra.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. II 1978). These four factors were first delineated in
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), by Mr. Justice Story- "In short
we must often look to the nature and objects of the selection made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." Id. at 348. See
note 36 supra.
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The fourth factor is crucial." 6
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first guideline for determining whether a fair use ex-
ists specifically states that purpose and character of the use
shall "includ[e] whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes."'11 7 Fair use has tradi-
tionally been more readily found for noncommercial uses, es-
pecially nonprofit educational purposes."18 Thus a key consid-
eration in any fair use case is the characterization of the use
as commercial or noncommerical. The purpose and character
of the use is judged in relation to the "infringer." In discuss-
ing the purpose and character of the use, the Betamax court
correctly stated ' that, though noncommercial use is not nec-
essarily fair use,' 20 the fact that a use is noncommercial home
Other commentators had offered different sets of guidelines. Cohen listed eight
factors as the test of fair use, any one of which could be decisive in a particular case:
"(1) the type of use involved; (2) the intent with which it was made; (3) its effect on
the original work; (4) the amount of the user's labor involved; (5) the benefit gained
by him; (6) the nature of the works involved; (7) the amount of material used; and (8)
its relative value." Cohen, supra note 41, at 53.
Yankewich cited a three-pronged test: "(1) the quantity and importance of the
portions taken; (2) their relation to the work of which they are a part; (3) the result of
their use upon the demand for the copyrighted publication." Yankewich, What Is
Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. Rav. 203, 213 (1954).
A factor not included in any of the above tests is the necessity of the use, e.g., is
the material otherwise available? Such a factor had been included in the 1964 bill to
amend the copyright law. Hearings on H.R. 4347 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.8, pt. 3, at 1694-1719 (1965)
(statement of John Schulman). See also Latman Study, supra note 11, at 30-31. As
all the commentators have recognized, all these factors are merely guidelines to be
used in judging each case on its facts.
116. H.C. Wainright & Co. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978);
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an
equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.
Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); A. LATmAN, supra note 11, at 214; M. NIMMER, supra note
11, at 13-61.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. II 1978).
118. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afl'd by
an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958). See H. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER 156
(1978); M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-59.
119. 480 F. Supp. at 453.
120. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777
(8th Cir. 1963). See M. Nimuza, supra note 11, at 13-58 to 13-59.
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use does indeed have bearing on the issue of fair use.121 The
court then observed that the purpose of VTR use is "to in-
crease access to the materials plaintiffs choose to broad-
cast." '122 However, all copyright infringements inevitably cre-
ate greater access to the materials. The court accurately
pointed out that the use widens access which would otherwise
be precluded by viewers' need to work or by counterprogram-
ming.12 Nevertheless, the desire for wider access does not an-
swer the question of whether the copyright holder should be
rewarded for the viewers' use of his material.
Finally, the court asserted without support that because
the use occurs in private homes, "enforcement of a prohibition
would be highly intrusive and practically impossible"'2 4 and
suggested that plaintiffs voluntary beaming of programs into
private homes would make such intrussion unwarranted.2 5
However, in choosing to have their materials broadcast, plain-
tiffs contracted only for a particular limited use-a use for
which they were paid. The true issue is whether contracting
with a television network to broadcast material carries a cor-
relative right in viewers to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights by
recording without any compensation to the copyright owner.
A person invited to a free movie preview in a public audito-
rium is not granted a right to infringe the copyright of that
movie. Nor should a home viewer be given a right to infringe
the copyrights of material beamed into his home.
An issue relating to purpose which the Betamax court ig-
nored is that the true target of the Betamax litigation is the
121. The greater freedom allowed home use under the copyright law rests on
several interconnected rationales. One rationale is the concept of the sanctity of the
home (see note 87 and accompanying text supra) mentioned in the Betamax opinion,
480 F. Supp. at 444-46. The tradition of personal use has long been assumed to be a
fair use. See Cohen, supra note 41, at 58; Latman Study, supra note 11, at 11-12.
Finally, a concept of "home use" has emerged in recent years. See Comment,
Betamax and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1181, 1207-18
[hereinafter cited as 1977 Duke Comment]; Nebraska Note, supra note 33, at 481.
However, this concept seems to coincide with the exception created by the Sound
Recording Amendment. Finally, the words "public" and "publicly" permeate the 1976
Act. E.g., §§ 106(3)-(5), 110(4). The word "publicly" is defined in § 101 as "at a place
open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered .... " 17 U.S.C. §
101 (Supp. II 1978). Home use can be interpreted as the converse of public use.
122. 480 F. Supp. at 454.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. See note 135 and accompanying text infra.
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corporate defendants as manufacturers-distributors." 6 The
court ignored the fact that the corporate defendants do in-
deed have a commercial (for-profit) purpose and must be dis-
tinguished from the individual home-user who has a noncom-
mercial purpose.
Another issue not dealt with by the Betamax court is how
to define commercial use in the home use situation. Three
possible definitions can be advanced: (1) to equate, as does
the current standard, commercial use with "for profit" use; (2)
to deem all nonpersonal uses as "commercial";1 2 7 or (3) to
gauge commercial use by either a saving of money by the user
or a denial of money to the copyright holder. 12 Under either
the current for-profit standard or the personal use standard
one who copies any protected work escapes liability as long as
he uses it only at home. Thus anyone is free to copy a copy-
righted masterpiece as long as it is for his personal use.
Surely, the copyright law was not intended to countenance
such acts. Furthermore, there is a difference between someone
copying a copyrighted work which he would not have other-
wise bought and copying from material for which the copy-
right owner would have been compensated. 12  More specifi-
cally, a scholar might never buy a journal from which he
copies material; he might instead choose to do without the
material entirely.180 Neither the for-profit nor the personal
use standard takes this distinction into account. Thus, a more
appropriate standard for "commercial" use would incorporate
a saving of money to the user or denial of return to the copy-
right holder.
The wording of the statute indicates that the use crite-
126. The only individual defendant who recorded plaintiffs' copyrighted mate-
rial after the effective date of the 1976 Act was a nominal defendant. See note 28
supra.
127. See Latman Study, supra note 11, at 11-12; Cohen, supra note 41, at 58.
See note 121 and accompanying text supra. A standard of personal versus nonper-
sonal or public use would not solve the problem in Betamax or similar cases where
large numbers of personal uses, when combined, have an enormous impact on the
plaintiff.
128. This standard incorporates factors (3) and (5) of Cohen's fair use test. See
note 115 supra. Perhaps the best standard for commercial use is incorporation into a
new and competitively vendable product.
129. Williams & Wilkens, 487 F.2d at 1364, 1370, 1377 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
See M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-85.
130. M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-85.
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rion is but one factor to be included in the calculus. 13 1 Where
the use is commercial, fair use is not often found.' 82 While
non-profit use weighs more heavily in the defendant's favor
than a commercial use, the statute indicates that a "nonprofit
educational purpose," counterposed to commercial use, is the
most likely purpose to be considered fair use. 88
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
In discussing the nature of the copyrighted material, the
Betamax court conceded that the material at issue "cannot be
categorized as 'scientific' or 'educational' """ which would
more readily support a defense of fair use. The court based its
discussion of the nature of the material on the fact that plain-
tiffs voluntarily chose to telecast the copyrighted material
over public airwaves free of charge, and that plaintiffs were
not paid for the material directly by the viewer but by broad-
casters and indirectly by advertisers based on drawing
power. 8 5 The court apparently reasoned that the plaintiff
copyright holders made use of public airwaves to disseminate
their work to a wider audience than would otherwise be feasi-
ble, and that this wider dissemination enhanced their reve-
nues from advertisers.
While use of public airwaves is distinctive to this mate-
rial, it does not justify altering the standards for copyright in-
fringement. No one has ever claimed that it is fair use to copy
material stored in public libraries or archives merely because
public means have been used to widen dissemination. Nor has
it been said that because the publicity generated by display-
ing a work of art in a public museum generated a market for
secondary material which thereby enriched the copyright own-
er, the copyright holder has waived his rights in the work of
art itself. Use of public arenas to disseminate copyrighted ma-
131. See notes 15 and 115 and accompanying text supra. HousE REPoRT, supra
note 10, at 66 states: "although the commercial or nonprofit character of a use is not
necessarily conclusive with respect to fair use, in combination with other factors it
can and should weigh heavily in fair use decisions."
132. See note 118 and accompanying text supra. See Latman Study, supra note
11, at 16.
133. The statute, it should be noted, refers to "nonprofit educational purpose."
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. II 1978). "Nonprofit educational use" is not synonymous
with "home use."
134. 480 F. Supp. at 452.
135. Id. at 453.
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terial and enrich the copyright holder has never been a form
of abandonment of copyright ownership. That copyright hold-
ers and viewers have no direct economic relationship does not
imply that viewers have any greater right to infringe plain-
tiffs' copyrights. Furthermore, that plaintiffs derive revenues
only indirectly from the alleged infringers of their work, ren-
dering harm more speculative, relates to the issue of harm and
not to the nature of the material.
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The court in Betamax accurately observed that "the more
substantial the taking from the copyrighted work, the less
likely it is that the fair use defense will be available. '"I 6 How-
ever, the court mistakenly states that copying an entire work
does not defeat a fair use defense3 7 because fair use is deter-
mined by a calculus of all factors.
Similarly, in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,'8
the Court of Claims stated: "It has sometimes been suggested
that the copying of an entire copyrighted work, any such
work, cannot ever be 'fair use,' but this is an overbroad gener-
alization, unsupported by the decisions and rejected by years
of accepted practice." 139 The court cited specific cases" and
observed that the handwritten or typed copy of an entire arti-
cle for personal use as well as individual copies of poems or
songs have long been held to be fair use.' Similarly, newspa-
per articles and court decisions are often copied in their en-
tirety and yet are considered fair use.14 2 The court thus con-
cluded that copying of entire copyrighted works does not
preclude fair use.14 3
136. Id. at 454.
137. Id.
138. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. C1. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975).
139. Id. at 1353.
140. 487 F.2d at 1353 n.12. See, e.g., New York Tribune, Inc. v. Otis & Co., 39
F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (supporting the proposition that copying an entire work
can be fair use).
141. 487 F.2d at 1353. See also Latman Study, supra note 11, at 11-12. The
Williams & Wilkins court seems to be confusing customary use with fair use here.
See note 67 and accompanying text supra and notes 144-45 and accompanying text
infra.




However, the Williams & Wilkins court here seemed to
confuse customary use with fair use.""' The fact that suits
have never been brought to oppose such actions as copying an
entire poem does not establish fair use. 1" Furthermore, many
cases hold that copying an entire work can never be fair
use, 14  and prior cases seemingly endorsing such copying as
fair use were affirmed by equally divided Supreme Courts and
are therefore not binding. 4 7 Another group of commentators
argues that copying of an entire work is a fair use only where
the copied work performs a different function than the origi-
144. See notes 67 and 141 and accompanying text supra. Care must also be
taken not to confuse fair use with exemptions. See note 7 supra. Thus use of entire
works is permitted by § 110(1) (entire movies or other materials for teaching); § 111
(relay of entire programs); § 114 (entire songs recorded). However, these are examples
of exemptions and not of fair use.
145. The areas cited by the Williams & Wilkins court as examples of copying
an entire work have not been the subject of litigation. Thus there is no case law
supporting the claim that the copying was fair use. See Latman Study, supra note 11,
at 11-12; M. NIMhm, supra note 11, at 13-80, 13-81. The mere "existence of a custom
* . . is not a reason for the existence of the fair use doctrine." Cohen, supra note 41,
at 52. But see Rosenfield I, supra note 48, at 219.
146. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir. 1962); Public Affairs Assocs.,
Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S.
111 (1962) on remand. 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239
F.2d 532, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1956); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th
Cir. 1937); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 384-85 (D.
Conn. 1972). The latter cases involved distribution of numerous copies of an entire
work, not merely the making of one copy for personal use.
147. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), afl'd sub nom., Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), af'd by
an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), af'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975). While an aflirmance by an equally divided Supreme Court is binding on the
immediate parties, it has no precedential value for other cases. Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972); A. LATmAN, supra note 11, at 208; M. NIMMER, supra note 11,
at 13-88, 13-89. While such an affirmance is not binding on subsequent litigants, that
four Supreme Court justices agreed on the issue is of some weight. Nevertheless, it
can be argued that Congress, by enacting § 108, has tacitly overruled Williams &
Wilkins.
Commentators have speculated on how Justice Blackmun, who did not partici-
pate in the decision, might have voted. Nimmer, Photocopying and Record Piracy: Of
Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1052 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Record Piracy]. In Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962), while sitting
on the Eighth Circuit, Blackmun had voted with the majority that copying of an
entire work is not fair use in a case where 48 copies of a song were made by a teacher.
Furthermore, the tenor of questions asked by Justice Blackmun during oral argument
in Williams & Wilkins indicates he would not have decided in favor of fair use. See
M. NIMMER, supra, note 11, at 13-87, 13-88 n.122 (quoting a portion of oral argument
in the case).
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nal.14 8 By any of the standards, VTR copying of entire works
is not fair use.
4. The Effect upon the Potential Market for or Value of
the Copyrighted Work
The Betamax opinion begins by discussing harm to plain-
tiffs as the key factor in determining fair use.149 It asserts that
the harm alleged by plaintiffs is based on too many assump-
tions to preclude a fair use defense.160 The court's analysis of
harm to plaintiffs is inadequate, as was the Williams & Wil-
kins opinion on the issue of harm to plaintiff. After citing
Nimmer's criticism of the Williams & Wilkins opinion that
the issue of harm in relation to fair use depends on whether
the cumulative effect of the alleged infringement by all poten-
tial defendants would injure plaintiff's potential market and
not on whether the particular activity of the defendant in the
suit resulted in damages to the plaintiff, 51 the court proceeds
to ignore Nimmer's caveat.
Harm to a copyright infringement plaintiff is difficult to
prove,152 and this difficulty led to the introduction of statu-
tory damages.158 The court cites plaintiffs' admission that no
actual harm had occurred to date and that their profits had
increased yearly.1 " However, that admission does not deter-
mine the cumulative year-to-year effect Betamax will have on
the value of plaintiffs' copyrights. The court failed to recog-
nize that harm to copyright plaintiffs need not be statistically
established harm,155 but can be inferred where potential sale
or value of plaintiffs' copyrighted materials is likely to be
diminished.
148. M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-71. Nimmer cites the example of "inci-
dental use" of an entire work which has been held to be a fair use where the plain-
tiff's material is not supplanted. Id. at 13-72. Similarly, Braille reproductions of copy-
righted works are a fair use because the two do not compete. See 1969 Duke Note,
supra note 50, at 102; Home Videorecording, aupra note 49, at 608.
149. 480 F. Supp. at 450. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
150. 480 F. Supp. at 451-52.
151. Id. at 451.
152. Freid, supra note 37, at 504-05, 518.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (Supp. II 1978). Freid, supra note 37, at 506-07 n.46,
518; Record Piracy, supra note 147, at 1053. See note 174 and accompanying text
infra.
154. 480 F. Supp. at 439, 452.




However, irrespective of whether Betamax does any of
the things alleged-reduce the quantity of time a viewer
watches television, create recorded tapes to be stored for li-
brary purposes, permit deletion of commercials, 56 reduce re-
run audiences15 7 -if advertisers believed Betamax caused any
reduced audience they would be unwilling to pay the same
high advertising rates and harm to plaintiffs would result.
The court's distinction between harm to profits and harm
which imperils the existence of the copyrighted material " is
artificial. The issue is harm to plaintiffs. When a work has al-
ready been published, the inevitable harm is harm to its
value. Only rarely is the very existence of a work at issue. 5 9
The fact remains that substantial financial harm to a plaintiff
can be as injurious as suppression of a work which might not
have been financially successful.
The court states that any reduced revenues from lower
ratings and advertising fees can be recouped by manufacture
of videodiscs to compete with the VTR industry.' e0 However,
no one has ever required that the owner of a copyright make
up losses he incurs from infringement of his copyright in one
area of business by increased output of a second product. Fur-
thermore, Betamax home recording competes with the vide-
odisc line of plaintiffs' products as well,"' without rewarding
plaintiffs for the use of their copyrighted material.
Finally, it should be noted that effect on the potential
market or value of plaintiff's copyrighted work is grounded on
the idea that a work which competes with the original or fills
the same demand as the first work necessarily injures the po-
156. Statistical proof supports the conclusion that advertisements are not usu-
ally deleted. 480 F. Supp. at 439.
157. See Nebraska Note, supra note 33, at 469 n.10; note 100 and accompany-
ing text supra.
158. 480 F. Supp. at 452.
159. A case in which the very existence of the work was at issue was Rosemont
Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967), which involved publication of a biography of Howard Hughes against his
wishes.
160. 480 F. Supp. at 452.
161. See id. at 433, 435-36. Prerecorded videodiscs manufactured by plaintiff
and prerecorded videocassettes manufactured by defendant for use only on their re-
spective machines do provide a reward to copyright owners. It is the home recording
done on blank tapes by VTR machines such as Betamax which deprives the copyright
owner of his income.
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tential market for or value of a copyrighted work.162 Because
Betamax copies supplant the need for the original works with-
out rewarding the copyright owners, the value of the copyright
must inevitably be reduced.
On the other hand, an argument not developed in the
opinion is that Betamax enhances the value of plaintiffs'
copyrighted material. Much of Betamax use is recording of
programs a viewer would not otherwise be able to see either
because of network counter-programming or because the
viewer was unable to be physically present to view a show
when aired. The recorded shows would then reach a larger au-
dience than would otherwise be possible. Because the rating
services have the capability of measuring this "Betamax audi-
ence" I6 and because statistics show commercials are usually
included,'" advertising rates would be positively affected. In
fact, since most commercials are not deleted, any "librarying"
of Betamax tapes only serves to increase the audience of the
commercials. Even if viewers are limited to a certain number
of hours of television viewing a week, and screening Betamax
recordings will diminish the audience and ratings of other
shows, these particular plaintiffs would not be the injured
parties. The reduced viewing would affect less popular shows,
not plaintiffs' programs. Thus a valid argument could be
made that Betamax enhances the value of plaintiffs' copy-
righted material.
An argument raised elsewhere is that Betamax enhances
the value of plaintiffs' copyrights because Betamax pre-
recorded software or videocassettes provide copyright holders
with direct compensation.' 65 However, this argument over-
looks the fact that copyright holders would receive greater di-
rect compensation from videodiscs with which videocassettes
compete if not for the existence of Betamax. Thus any direct
162. Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Hill v. Whalen and Martell, 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1914); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 60 (C.C. Mass. 1869); Robert Stigwood Group,
Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938); A. LATMAN, supra note 11, at
215; M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-62 to 13-66; Freid, supra note 37, at 504;
Latman Study, supra note 11, at 15-16; Cohen, supra note 41, at 63. See note 182 and
accompanying text infra.
163. 480 F. Supp. at 441.
164. Id. at 439.
165. VTR Implications, supra note 58, at 287.
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payments to copyright holders for videocassettes which are in
competition with videodiscs merely compensate the copyright
holder for revenues he would have received from videodiscs.
However, Betamax recording from television denies the copy-
right owner any direct revenue. Thus the net result of
Betamax use is a loss of revenue to the copyright holder. 1"6
Defendants could also argue that the "author's" incentive
to create may not be substantially reduced by failure to grant
him copyright protection in this area.167 His financial incen-
tives are already substantial, since his existing financial re-
turns from television broadcasters and indirectly from adver-
tisers are large.1 " Thus, it cannot be said that denial of
copyright protection operates as a disincentive.
D. Summary of "Fair Use" Analysis of Betamax
The court concluded that home copying of audiovisual
material, broadcast free of charge to Betamax owners over the
airwaves, is fair use of plaintiffs' works because such copying
is noncommerical and does not reduce the market for plain-
tiffs' works." Not only did the court misconstrue the legisla-
tive history of the Copyright Acts but it also failed to treat
the doctrine of fair use as an equitable rule of reasonableness.
The court completely ignored the fact that no countervailing
societal interest attending Betamax use overrides the copy-
right holder's exclusive rights to protection and thus failed to
balance the equities in the case. Such failure should preclude
application of the fair use doctrine.
Although the court made an analysis based on the four
factors enumerated in section 107, the key to its conclusion
was its opinion that no harm to plaintiffs would result. Yet
harm to plaintiff is always difficult to establish in copyright
cases. 170 In Williams & Wilkins a factor in the court's decision
166. Not only does sale of prerecorded cassettes for use on a Betamax merely
compensate for income copyright owners would otherwise derive from videodiscs
which use copyrighted material with license from the owner, but increased advertising
revenues from larger viewing audiences may not fully compensate copyright owners
for other losses. Increased revenues from enlarged viewing audiences must offset
losses from reduced rerun income, fewer movie rentals by the public, and diminishing
box office receipts.
167. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
168. See 480 F. Supp. at 440.
169. Id. at 456.
170. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
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to find fair use was a desire to give the benefit of the doubt to
science and the libraries rather than to the commercial plain-
tiffs. 171 In the Betamax situation there is no charitable or re-
search or scholarly interest to balance against a commercial
plaintiff. The significant defendants here are themselves com-
mercial entities. The court thus misconstrued the proper anal-
ysis of harm to plaintiffs' copyright.172 If left uncorrected, the
misconstruction will set a precedent that will likely be applied
in future cases to grant fair use protection to any new
technology.
V. THE DAMAGE ISSUE: THE NEED FOR A CORRECT STANDARD
The Williams & Wilkins and Betamax cases demon-
strated that the issue of harm to the plaintiff's copyright is so
critical in a fair use case that erroneous criteria for measuring
damage to the value of the copyrighted work can predeter-
mine the outcome of the case. A correct standard is thus
necessary.
A. Probable Effect and Not Actual Proof of Injury Is the
Appropriate Standard
The first issue is whether evidence of actual economic
harm must always be proved or whether probable detrimental
effect is sufficient. Both the Williams & Wilkins and Betamax
courts erroneously required proof of actual harm.1 73 However,
the Copyright Act of 1976 does not require that evidence of
specific damage must always be established. Indeed, the "stat-
utory damages" provision of the Act7'4 was enacted to fill a
void created by the difficulty of proving actual injury to copy-
right.175 Furthermore, the statute itself speaks of "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for . . . the copyrighted
work." 76
Although the statute speaks of potential markets and not
171. 487 F.2d at 1354. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 173-92 and accompanying text infra.
173. See M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-84; Freid, supra note 37, at 506-07.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
175. See note 153 and accompanying text supra.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. II 1978) (emphasis added). "[Tihe central ques-
tion in the determination of fair use is whether the infringing work tends to diminish




of potential effect on markets, a less stringent standard of
proof is nevertheless indicated. 177 Actual proof of "potential"
markets is far more difficult to establish than proof to present
markets. Furthermore, were actual damages always necessary,
the injunction remedy would be useless. 17 8
Indeed where a new industry is involved, as will inevita-
bly be so in Betamax or any other case involving new technol-
ogy left to fair use by the 1976 Act, proof of damages must
inevitably be speculative. Since new technologies are left to
fair use consideration by the 1976 Copyright Act, 7 9 fair use in
turn must contemplate damages not dependent on concrete
example. Otherwise, no damages would be provable and sec-
tion 107(4) would effectively be eliminated as a factor. 180 The
outcome of the suit would then be predetermined.
This "probable effects" test is one based on logic rather
than on demonstrable evidence.81 One method of determining
the probable effect of an alleged infringement is to demon-
strate that a use of the copyrighted work is likely to be sup-
planted by defendant's work. 182
177. Cases in which potential injury was held sufficient were Meredith Corp. v.
Harper & Row, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974);
Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa.
1938). In Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 184 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958), it was said:
The mere absence of competition or injurious effect upon the copy-
righted work will not make a use fair. The right of a copyright proprie-
tor to exclude others is absolute and if it has been violated the fact that
the infringement will not affect the sale or exploitation of the work or
pecuniarily damage him is immaterial.
Similarly, in Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978), the court looked to the potential future market for republication or
sale of movie rights of plaintiff's book (which had been out of print for 20 years). See
Record Piracy, supra note 147, at 1054; Freid, supra note 37, at 504-09, 517-19.
178. See 1969 Duke Note, supra note 50, at 90.
179. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
180. See Freid, supra note 37, at 504-05.
181. Id. at 505.
182. Id. at 505 n.39. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Inc., 378 F.
Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974); Robert Stigwood Group,
Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1972); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.,
Inc. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
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B. The Measure Should Include Harm from All Potential
Infringers and Not Merely the Immediate Defendant
The Williams & Wilkins and Betamax courts erroneously
confined evidence of diminution in value of the copyrighted
work to that caused by the immediate defendant. 188 The ap
propriate measure of damage is that caused by all potential
"infringers" collectively. "[T]he loss through 'fair use' of [a]
work cannot be measured in terms of any individual use, but
only in terms of the total use and total copying."1" For if a
use of a copyrighted work is sanctioned with respect to the
immediate defendant, not only does the immediate defendant
feel free to take advantage of the copyrighted work, but all
others who wish to make the same appropriation without any
compensation to the copyright owner may feel free to do so.
C. Plaintiff's Continuing Profitability Does Not Prove a
Lack of Damage to the Value of the Copyrighted Work
A third commonplace mistake made in infringement anal-
ysis is the assumption that plaintiff's continued profitability
negates the possibility of injury to his copyright.18 ' The fact
that a plaintiff has experienced increased profitability despite
the introduction of the allegedly infringing activity (e.g., use
of Betamax), should not be determinative: plaintiff might
have experienced even greater profitability without the al-
leged infringement. "The use may tend to decrease the sales,
but other factors not related to the use may be simultaneously
working to increase the sales." 186 Furthermore, where a corpo-
rate plaintiff is involved, it is insufficient to merely look, as
did the Betamax court, at plaintiff's overall profitability in re-
cent years. In large corporations profitability is the sum of di-
visional results. Evidence of harm should be sought in the ap-
183. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1368 (Ct. Cl.
1973), affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (Cowen, C.J., dissent-
ing). See M. NIMMER, supra note 11, at 13-73 and 13-84; Record Piracy, supra note
147; Home Videorecording, supra note 49, at 612.
184. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Pat-
ents, Trademarks, and Copyright, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 109 (1967) (statement of Howard A. Meyerhoff).
185. See Freid, supra note 37, at 505 n.38; Home Videorecording, supra note
49, at 612-13. This error is related to the "probable effect" error. See notes 173-82
and accompanying text supra.
186. Freid, supra note 37, at 505 n.38.
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propriate unit of plaintiff corporation and not in results of
overall operations. In particular, improved profits from a sec-
ond area of endeavor can conceal lower profits from the divi-
sion immediately affected by the copyright infringement.
D. Total Destruction of the Value of Plaintiff's Copyright
Is Unnecessary; Mere Harm Can Be Sufficient to Preclude a
Finding of Fair Use
Some commentators have drawn a distinction between
harm which threatens the very existence of a work and mere
harm to economic profit. 87 The former is viewed as more seri-
ous because publication ceases and valuable information be-
comes unavailable.188 Where mere economic harm results, the
economic incentive to create is diminshed but publication
continues. Since fair use is an equitable doctrine which in-
volves a balancing process, total destruction would require a
greater outweighing benefit than does mere economic harm.189
The Betamax court made this distinction between eco-
nomic injury and harm which threatens the very existence of
the copyrighted work. 190 In actuality, severe financial harm to
a plaintiff can be even more injurious than suppression of a
work which might not have enjoyed any financial success.
While the public suffers a more direct injury when a work
ceases to exist because the public is denied access to the infor-
mation contained within, the public also suffers indirectly
when economic harm befalls a copyright-holder.191 Since, in
theory, economic reward encourages intellectual creativity, a
reduced financial incentive will diminish creative output, and
the public will suffer an even longer-term harm.192 A court is
thus ill-advised to require destruction of the copyrighted work
to find injury. Mere harm should be sufficient.
187. Freid, supra note 37, at 509 n.53; VTR Implications, supra note 58, at 288.
See notes 158-59 and accompanying text supra.
188. Freid, supra note 37, at 509 n.53.
189. Id.
190. 480 F. Supp. at 452.
191. Freid, supra note 37, at 509 n.53.
192. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
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E. New Forms of Technology Make Accurate Measurement
of Injury to Plaintiffs Copyright More Difficult
In considering what standard should be used to measure
injury to plaintiff's copyright, one must bear in mind the pur-
poses of both the copyright scheme and the fair use doctrine.
Both were introduced primarily to protect the public interest
in creation and broad dissemination of works of the intellect,
and in conjunction therewith to reward "authors" a sufficient
return for their efforts to encourage their creativity. 193 The
"fair use" doctrine was judicially created to deal with the situ-
ation where societal interest in the progress of science and
useful arts dictates that a second work should be encouraged,
at the sacrifice of awarding financial return to another copy-
right holder.194
Thus a fair use calculus must measure the merits of the
allegedly infringing work against the possibility that the de-
nial to a copyright owner of award for his efforts will discour-
age creativity. Where the protected original author receives
compensation beyond that involved in the immediate litiga-
tion it is possible that his recompense will be sufficient to
maintain his incentive to create. In the Betamax situation,
plaintiff copyright holders do receive a return from television
broadcasters who display their work, from movie theaters,
movie rentals, and videodiscs.195 However, the concern under-
lying plaintiffs' suit is that Betamax will supplant these other
media to such a degree that their reward will eventually no
longer be sufficient to cover the enormous costs and risks of
producing movies and other copyrighted works.196 This prob-
lem will commonly arise with other forms of new technology
which gradually supplant traditional forms of copyrighted
works,197 for even where seemingly sufficient reward presently
exists without protection against the immediate use, as the
new use supplants the traditional, that adequate reward may
disappear.
193. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
194. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
195. See notes 100 & 157 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text supra. See generally Home Vide-
orecording, supra note 49, at 574-83.
197. See notes 212-14 and accompanying text infra.
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VI. FINDING OF INFRINGEMENT WILL NOT FORECLOSE VTR
DEVICES FROM THE MARKET, As MODIFICATIONS COULD SOLVE
THE COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS
In making a determination of whether or not VTR re-
cording for home use is fair use, the court is not forced to
decide between only two alternatives- continued use of VTR
machines in their present form or a total ban on their use. A
finding of infringement will not foreclose VTR devices from
the market. By finding present use of VTR devices not to be
fair use and issuing an injunction against the present form of
VTR use, the court nevertheless leaves defendants free to
adapt their technology to conform with copyright law.
While defendants have argued that a Betamax machine is
merely a "time shift" machine,198 as presently used it is not.
However, with limited modification the machines and tapes
can be adapted to minimize injury to copyright-holders and at
the same time permit the broadest possible dissemination of
televised material.
A distinction must be drawn between temporary taping
for one-time use and "librarying" of tapes recorded by the
consumer. "Librarying," achieved by retention for multiple re-
plays of consumer-recorded videotaped programs, competes
with the copyrighted work in the videodisc, movie rental, box
office, and television rerun markets. Temporary taping, on the
other hand, truly serves as a "time shift" machine and broad-
ens the viewing audience reached by "authors" and, as long as
advertisements are not deleted, by advertisers. Temporary
taping thus not only provides broader dissemination of mate-
rial to the public, but could raise the fees advertisers will pay
for the increased audience. 1" The copyright owner could in
turn receive an increased reward which would be an incentive
for further productivity.
Because prerecorded videocassettes are sold for use on
Betamax machines,0 0 the machines themselves should not be
adapted to erase all tapes as they play. However, if the blank
tapes manufactured for consumer recording were made to
198. Defendant's Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law (Trial Memo-
randum) at 3, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
199. See 1977 Duke Comment, supra note 121, at 1201; Home Videorecording,
supra note 49, at 616-17; notes 162-64 and accompanying text supra.
200. 480 F. Supp. at 435.
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self-erase as they are played, the "librarying" problem is
eliminated.
If modification of the blank tapes proves impossible, an
alternate solution is to tax blank tapes as they are sold. Co-
pyright holders already receive a return on the prerecorded
cassettes sold for use on VTR machines. By directly taxing
the blank tapes, a user pays in proportion to the amount of
"librarying" he is doing. 01 Taxing the machine itself, on the
other hand, does not allocate the tax according to the amount
of consumer recording done. 03 Such a system has been insti-
tuted in West Germany. °30 The tax collected can be put in a
fund similar to the one presently operated by BMI for
records,204 from which allocations would be made to copyright
owners.
In addition to self-erasing tapes or a tax on blank tapes,
VTR machines should be manufactured to remove the ability
to eliminate commercials. When no "pause switch" is in-
cluded, the advertiser can be certain his messages are reaching
an enlarged audience, and the copyright owner will in turn re-
ceive greater compensation. While the advertiser will no
longer be able to know at precisely what time his message -will
reach each member of his audience, he will know he is reach-
ing the live audience at the given time, and the VTR audience
at some future time. Because rating services have the capabil-
ity of measuring the live audience as well as the VTR audi-
ence, 05 these statistics will be available to advertisers. The
advertiser may still ascertain who and how many are in a live
"prime time" audience from various market surveys. Any
displacement in "prime time" advertising rates will be com-
pensated by enlarged audiences reachable by "slack hour"
201. Holland, supra note 99, at 126.
202. Cf. Home Videorecording, supra note 49, at 626-27 (proposal to tax the
videotape machine at the time of purchase).
203. Copyright Statute of the German Federal Republic, Art. 53(5), Act of Sep-
tember 9, 1965. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1972). A
five percent tax is collected and is payable to the authors through GEMA, the au-
thors' society. See Klaver, The Legal Problems of VideoCasettes and Audio-Visual
Discs, 23 BuLL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 152, 168, 173-74 (1976).
204. Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American Society of Composers, Au-
thors, and Publishers (ASCAP) have experience in redistribution of royalty fees to
the proper recipient. A formula for redistribution would have to be set, but this is not
an insurmountable barrier.
205. 480 F. Supp. at 441.
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programming via VTR. e Since there is merely time displace-
ment and not geographical displacement, 07 advertisers would
be willing to pay greater overall fees.
Under the system proposed-elimination of the pause
control mechanism from the machine and either self-erasing
blank tapes or a tax on the sale of blank tapes-the problems
of enforcement with which the Betamax court was concerned
would no longer be an issue. The solution ensures a return to
copyright holders, while encouraging a broad dissemination of
televised programming, yet does not involve any invasion of
the sanctity of the private home. The systems outlined above
provide a solution to the VTR problem without abandoning
copyrighted works to the public domain. The proposal bal-
ances the rights of copyright holders and the needs of con-
sumers and thus resolves the current problem without abro-
gating the rights of those involved. It thus hopefully achieves
a more just solution than was indicated in the Williams &
Wilkins and Betamax cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both the Williams & Wilkins and Betamax courts misap-
prehended the burden of proof and damage issues in their
analyses of home VTR use.'0 8 Since the decisions are the most
recent and prominent fair use cases involving new forms of
technology, there is a danger that their pronouncements will
establish a precedent2'0 for interpreting the fair use of such
technology. Since harm to plaintiff's copyright will never be
easy to demonstrate where a new technology or new industry
is involved, 10 the decisions sanction as fair use virtually any
206. See Home Videorecording, supra note 49, at 616. Cf. VTR Implications,
supra note 58, at 293-94 n.77 (advertisers unwilling to pay premiums for prime time
slots, if time slots no longer have any relevance to network economics).
207. Where a geographic displacement occurs, an advertiser cannot be sure his
audience is within his marketing zone. An advertiser would be willing to pay for an
enlarged VTR audience within his market because they are his potential customers.
The fact that no advertiser will increase his rates for distant viewers was the rationale
for providing compensation for distant transmissions in § 111 of the new Act, 17
U.S.C. § 111 (Supp. II 1978).
208. See notes 44-55 & 173-92 and accompanying text supra. In fact, the analy-
ses are so similar that one wonders if the Betamax decision was patterned on the
Williams & Wilkins decision.
209. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
210. See notes 173-82 and accompanying text supra.
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new form of technology adapted for home use. If, in addition,
plaintiff is deemed to have the burden of proving absence of
fair use,211 the outcome of any fair use case is largely
predetermined.
The mere fact of home use by the user and independent
compensation to the copyright holder from other sources
should not inevitably establish "fair use" and therefore nonin-
fringement since copyright holders may ultimately be denied
all revenues from new technological adaptations of their work
while older forms of use of the copyrighted works are simulta-
neously replaced by the technological advances.21 The return
to copyright holders might diminish to the point where incen-
tive to create is seriously eroded. For instance, in the future
the majority of households may have computer terminals
which may be linked to the local library to get a print-out of a
book.2 3 While under the present system any given book can
be read by only one user at a time, a computerized system will
enable simultaneous use of one book by any number of read-
ers. The author would recover a reward only from the one
book purchased. Not only would libraries need to acquire
fewer books than the several they now do for circulation pur-
poses, but the reading public would be less inclined to buy
their own editions21 because there would no longer be a wait-
ing period for books and readers would in fact receive their
own print-out of the book on their terminal. Under the analy-
ses presented by the Williams & Wilkins and Betamax
courts, such home use would be held to be a fair use.
The boundaries of technology are unforeseeable. It is
clear, however, that the present analysis of fair use, if left un-
corrected, will render all uses confined to the home to be non-
infringing fair uses. Ultimately, copyright owners will lose
211. See notes 44-55 and accompanying text supra.
212. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
213. See PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SCIENCE, GOVERNMENT AND
INFORMATION 20-21 (Jan. 10, 1963), quoted in Crossland, supra note 41, at 234; Home
Videorecording, supra note 49, at 630 (citing Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on
S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1066 (1966) (statement of Irwin Karp, Authors
League of America)).
214. However, an argument can be made that there is a tradition of buying
books which will not readily be displaced by availability of computer print-outs. See
Disk-Television, supra note 99, at 698-99. While libraries might buy fewer books, the
reading public who purchase books for collection at present might continue to do so.
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their economic reward and the incentive to create will be de-
stroyed; and the public, for whose benefit the copyright laws
exist, will be denied "Progress of Science and useful Arts."

